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Abstract
Our study makes use of data from a panel of over 400 private colleges and universities on their presidents’
salaries and benefits. These data, reported annually to the Internal Revenue Service on Form 990, have been
collected by and reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education for academic years 1992–1993 through
1997–1998. We merge these data with those from other sources including the American Association of
University Professors, the American Council on Education, Who’s Who in America, the National Association
of College and University Business Officers, the Council on Aid to Education, and the National Science
Foundation’s CASPAR system. This array of sources permits us to estimate salary and compensation level and
change equations.
We first provide descriptive statistics on the compensation, mobility, and personal characteristics of presidents
of American private colleges and universities. The next section estimates a model of the determinants of
presidents’ salary and compensation levels. We then exploit the longitudinal nature of our data and present
analyses of presidents’ salary and compensation changes. A brief conclusion summarizes our findings.
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Paying Our Presidents:
What Do Trustees Value?
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, John J. Cheslock, and Julia Epifantseva
In 1997–1998, five private college and university presidents earned more
than $500,000 in salaries and benefits. One reporter quipped in a recent
story in the Chronicle of Higher Education, “If you’re a private college presi-
dent and you are not making at least $300,000 a year, maybe it’s time to
renegotiate your contract” (Burd, 1999).
To many faculty members at private, doctoral-level, comprehensive, and
baccalaureate institutions whose average compensation in 1997–1998 was
$91,972, $64,774 and $64,286, respectively, compensation packages for presi-
dents of these magnitudes do indeed seem excessive (American Associa-
tion, 1998). These highly paid presidents, however, are the chief executive
officers (CEOs) of institutions whose operating budgets sometimes reach
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well over $1 billion a year. Viewed from this perspective, private college and
university presidents are paid considerably less than their CEO counter-
parts who head for-profit corporations of similar sizes. Nonetheless, just as
some have argued that corporate CEOs are over paid, high compensation
levels or compensation increases for some college presidents have recently
been publicized, criticized, and used as examples of waste and inefficiency
in higher education. For example, the New York State Board of Regents
ruled in 1997 that the pay and benefits of Adelphi University’s president
Peter Diamandopoulos was excessive and disbanded the Adelphi Board of
Trustees for failing to exercise adequate fiduciary responsibility.
Surprisingly, very little is known about the compensation structure ap-
plied to American college and university presidents. The extensive litera-
ture on corporate CEOs shows that their compensation is often either
explicitly or implicitly structured to provide incentives for them to act in
their shareholders’ interests (Murphy, 1999). Incentives also apparently ex-
ist in the compensation structures of such appointed government execu-
tives as city managers and school superintendents, encouraging them to act
in their constituents’ interests (Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, & Ehrenberg, 1988;
Goldstein & Ehrenberg, 1976). However, the few studies that have addressed
private college and university presidents’ compensation have used only cross-
section data to explain differences in compensation across institutions
(Boulanger & Pliskin, 1999; Pfeffer, & Ross, 1988). Such data do not enable
researchers to ascertain if academic presidents’ compensation is structured
to provide incentives for them to act in the best interests of their institu-
tions’ constituents.
A private academic institution’s constituents include its students, fac-
ulty, and alumni. Its constituents also include corporations, private foun-
dations, and federal, state and local governments. However, in the end it is
the board of trustees that determines the compensation and tenure in of-
fice of private college presidents. At base, then, our paper is an effort to
infer what the trustees of private academic institutions value.
This was not be an easy task. Nearly 20 percent of the private academic
institutions that took part in one recent national survey do not require per-
formance reviews from their presidents (Atwell & Wellman, 2000, p. 59).
Similarly, there is not always agreement that president’s compensation
changes should be related to the results of board-conducted performance
reviews (Ingram & Weary, 2000, pp. 17–18). Nonetheless, within these limi-
tations, we strive to infer whether variables that we believe trustees should
value do, in fact, influence their presidents’ compensation changes.
Our study makes use of data from a panel of over 400 private colleges
and universities on their presidents’ salaries and benefits. These data, re-
ported annually to the Internal Revenue Service on Form 990, have been
collected by and reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education for academic
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years 1992–1993 through 1997–1998.1  We merge these data with those from
other sources including the American Association of University Professors,
the American Council on Education, Who’s Who in America, the National
Association of College and University Business Officers, the Council on Aid
to Education, and the National Science Foundation’s CASPAR system. This
array of sources permits us to estimate salary and compensation level and
change equations.
We first provide descriptive statistics on the compensation, mobility, and
personal characteristics of presidents of American private colleges and uni-
versities. The next section estimates a model of the determinants of presi-
dents’ salary and compensation levels. We then exploit the longitudinal
nature of our data and present analyses of presidents’ salary and compen-
sation changes. A brief conclusion summarizes our findings.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Each year private colleges and universities report the salaries and ben-
efits of their five highest paid employees to the Internal Revenue Service on
Form 990. If the president of an institution is not among the five highest
paid employees, the institution is also required to report the same informa-
tion for the president. (This situation arises most often when a medical
college is part of a university.) Starting with the data for academic year 1992–
1993 (for salary) and 1993–1994 (for benefits), the Chronicle of Higher Edu-
cation has collected and published information on private four-year college
and university presidents’ compensation for institutions classified as re-
search, doctoral, comprehensive, and liberal arts I (Carnegie, 1994).
At the outset, we must acknowledge that these data are subject to consid-
erable measurement errors. Sometimes institutions fail to report deferred
compensation that was “earned” during the year. Sometimes they fail to
report the portion of the president’s compensation that comes from related
organizations such as university foundations. Institutions always exclude
any compensation that the president receives from corporate or founda-
tion boards on which he or she sits, even if the board membership is im-
plicitly part of the president’s compensation and is arranged by a key trustee
or alumnus of the institution. Finally, institutions sometimes undervalue
or fail to report perquisites that the president receives as part of his or her
compensation package. Nonetheless, the data from the Form 990 reports
are the best private college and university presidents’ compensation data
that are publicly available.
1Presidents’ salary data have been reported since 1992–1993; however, presidents’ ben-
efits data are available only since 1993–1994. Data for 1998–1999 were recently published—
too late to be incorporated in our study.
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Table 1 presents data on the mean salaries of four-year private college
and university presidents annually for 1992–1993 to 1997–1998. Similar
data are reported for the sum of salaries and benefits for 1993–1994 to 1997–
1998. The means are reported each year in the aggregate and separately for
Carnegie category research, doctoral, comprehensive and liberal arts insti-
tutions. We excluded presidents who had salaries under $40,000 a year, were
interim or part-year presidents, or whose salary data were not reported in
any of the years of this study.
The average president’s salary was over $185,000 in 1997–1998. Average
salaries vary widely across the Carnegie Foundation categories of institu-
tions, however, ranging from a low of almost $160,000 at comprehensive
institutions to a high of over $343,000 at research universities. When re-
ported benefits are added to the presidents’ salaries to get a measure of their
compensation, average compensation varied from about $187,000 at the
comprehensive institutions to over $393,000 at the research universities.
How have the presidents’ salaries and benefits changed over time? Panel
A of Table 2 presents information on the distribution of the president’s
salary changes during the 1992–1993 to 1996–1997 period, in the aggregate
and by category of institution. Excluded from this table are presidents who
began their terms of office after 1992–1993, presidents who left their posi-
tions prior to 1996–1997, and presidents whose institutions were not present
in the sample each year.
During the 1992–1997 period, the presidents received an average 25.5%
increase in salary. The median salary increase was 20.8%. Presidents of re-
search universities and liberal arts colleges fared slightly better, on average,
than their counterparts at doctoral and comprehensive institutions. To focus
on the average increases, however, is to ignore the variation in the increases
that occurred across presidents. Indeed, the 25th to 75th percentile range
for presidents’ salary increases during the period was about 13 to 33%.
Each year, average salary increases for faculty members differ across in-
stitutions. Hence, it is natural to ask how the presidents’ salary increases
varied relative to the changes in the average salaries of the faculty members
at their institutions.2  As Panel B of the table indicates, the average salary
increase of the presidents exceeded the average salary increase of faculty at
their institutions by 13.5% during the period. Presidents of research uni-
versities gained less relative to their faculty than presidents at other catego-
ries of institutions. The median differences between the salary increases of
2It is important to recognize that we are truly comparing apples and oranges here. A
president’s salary change is the growth of a single individual’s earnings over time. The change
in the average faculty salary at an institution is determined both by the percentage change in
the salary pool that is provided by the institution each year and the change of the distribu-
tion of faculty members across ranks and ages during the period.
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TABLE 1
MEAN SALARIES AND BENEFITS OF PRIVATE COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS
1992–1993 TO 1997–1998
All Institutions
1992–1993 385 $142,428 62,719
1993–1994 429 146,603 58,291 384 $174,072 72,708
1994–1995 422 156,587 65,054 385 185,073 79,438
1995–1996 421 162,570 63,693 391 191,473 85,202
1996–1997 427 172,226 71,061 401 200,741 83,122
1997–1998 418 185,539 89,247 392 217,232 102,694
Research
1992–1993 31 $254,406  92,407
1993–1994 34 259,218 66,993 33 $302,086 78,752
1994–1995 37 288,685 87,127 37 335,378 97,712
1995–1996 36 296,778 55,856 36 353,108 125,583
1996–1997 38 314,330 74,142 38 355,682 85,596
1997–1998 35 343,469 79,220 34 393,644 89,978
Doctoral
1992–1993 32 $184,127 70,388
1993–1994 35 184,798 63,517 33 $223,539 92,672
1994–1995 33 194,970 64,041 31 234,821 81,002
1995–1996 30 207,517 67,572 30 246,906 84,711
1996–1997 30 211,668 73,838 30 250,913 84,691
1997–1998 30 239,046 88,997 30 278,025 102,304
Comprehensive
1992–1993 186 $123,651 49,233
1993–1994 211 125,666 39,894 175 $146,901 50,313
1994–1995 210 133,718 42,516 182 154,577  52,701
1995–1996 206 141,095 47,982 181 161,322 55,932
1996–1997 211 150,069 54,518 189 171,786 61,743
1997–1998 205 159,933 59,509 187 186,695 72,353
Liberal Arts
1992–1993 136 $132,773 31,004
1993–1994 149 141,582 41,615 143 $166,366 49,769
1994–1995 142 147,068 35,969 135 173,568 45,726
1995–1996 149 150,784 33,444 144 177,412  44,427
1996–1997 148 159,335 38,972 144 187,405 52,629
1997–1998 148 172,899  84,102 141 202,362 92,824
Source: Authors’ calculations from data reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education.
Note: Interim, partial-year presidents, and presidents with salaries below $40,000 not included.
Types of
Institutions
   Salaries
Obs.      Mean      Std Dev
 Salaries and Benefits
Obs.      Mean      Std Dev
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presidents and the faculty members’ average salary increases at their insti-
tutions are somewhat smaller in the aggregate and in each institutional cat-
egory. There is considerable variation in this difference across all institutions
and across institutions within each institutional category. The 25th to 75th
percentile range for this measure across all institutions was 0.8 to 21.0 per-
centage points. However, as Panel B indicates, some president’s salaries in-
creased at slower rates than the rate of increase of their faculty members’
average salaries during the period.
Data on presidents’ benefits are available starting in 1993–1994. Table 2
also shows how increases in presidents’ pay (Panel C) and pay plus benefits
(Panel D) compared to the increases in the average salary of faculty at their
institutions between 1993–1994 and 1996–1997. The pattern of results for
presidents’ pay is very similar to that reported in the previous panel, al-
though the increases are somewhat smaller, due to the three-year period for
which data are available. When presidents’ pay plus benefits is used, the
patterns are again similar.
Our empirical analyses of changes in compensation (below) address the
relationship between salary increases and “institutional performance” for
presidents who remain in their positions for the entire four-year period.
This time frame may overlook rewards that come in the form of opportu-
nities to move to higher paying positions.3  Thus, it is important to also
understand the mobility pattern of individuals in the sample.
Table 3 summarizes where each president, who was in the sample in 1993–
1994, 1994–1995, 1995–1996, or 1996–1997, was residing the following year.
A few institutions that reported data in one year did not report it in the
next year, thus making it impossible to follow their presidents’ careers. About
90% of the presidents in the sample each year were at the same institution
the next year. Only seven moved to a presidency at another private institu-
tion that was in the sample during the four-year period. Finally, between 5
to 12% of the presidents in the sample in each year (26 to 48 in number)
disappeared from the sample the next year.
Our empirical analyses of presidents’ salary and compensation changes
(below) are restricted to those presidents who remained in office through
1996–1997, because data on several of the explanatory variables we use in
the salary change models were not available for 1997–1998 at the time we
wrote the paper. One hundred sixteen of the presidents had left the sample
by 1996–1997. A search of Who’s Who in America provided biographical
information for slightly fewer than half. Information on subsequent activi-
ties for all but two of the remaining presidents who had left the sample by
3Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg (1988) showed that the reward for high-per-
forming school superintendents was most often offers from larger, better-paying school dis-
tricts and, less often, salary increases in their current school district.
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN PRESIDENTS’ SALARIES AND BENEFITS
A. Percent of Change in Salary: 1992–1993 to 1996–1997
All 269 25.5 20.8 12.9 33.0
Research 21 23.2 18.7 15.6 31.6
Doctoral 17 23.3 17.4 11.1 22.3
Comprehensive 141 26.9 22.5 12.7 36.1
Liberal Arts 90 24.3 20.3 13.3 30.6
B. Percent of Change in Salary - Percent of Change in Average Faculty Salary: 1992–1993 to
1996–1997
All 260 13.5 9.1 0.8 20.9
Research 21 6.5 2.7 -2.1 13.6
Doctoral 16 11.9 6.0 -2.5 14.4
Comprehensive 137 14.9 10.7 -0.7 23.1
Liberal Arts 86 13.1 8.5 2.3 20.3
C. Percent of Change in Salary - Percent of Change in Average Faculty Salary: 1993–1994 to
1996–1997
All 288 8.8 5.1 -1.9 14.2
Research 26 8.2 5.4 1.1 13.5
Doctoral 17 14.2 1.4 -3.8 11.3
Comprehensive 150 9.9 5.8 -2.0 19.9
Liberal Arts 95 6.3 4.8 -0.8 12.3
D. Percent of Change in Salary and Benefits - Percent of Change in Average Faculty Salary:
1993–1994 to 1996–1997
All 257 9.4 5.8 -2.3 16.1
Research 25 8.6 6.7 -2.6 13.4
Doctoral 16 21.4 4.7 -1.5 19.0
Comprehensive 124 9.5 6.5 -3.1 18.4
Liberal Arts 92 7.4 4.9 -1.5 13.6
Source: Authors’ calculations from data reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education.
Note: Interim, partial-year presidents, and presidents with salaries below $40,000 not included.
 N Mean Median 25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
1996–1997 was obtained from exhaustive searches of the World Wide Web
that we conducted and from a telephone survey of presidents’ offices con-
ducted by Cornell’s Computer Assisted Survey Team (CAST) in May 2000.
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 The post-presidency activities of the presidents who left the sample were
varied. Sixty-four were retired or emeritus. Five were presidents at institutions
not included in our sample. Nine held administrative positions below the rank
of president or faculty positions at other academic institutions, while seven had
returned to the faculty at their own (predominantly liberal arts) institutions.
Twenty were employed in the government or nonprofit sectors, primarily as
executives or trustees of private foundations; this latter group also included
a congressman and an ambassador. Finally, six were self-employed, often as
consultants, or employed in the corporate world. Three were deceased.
Interestingly, only one individual in our sample became president of a
public college or university during the period. Table 4 presents data from
an annual survey of the pay of academic administrators conducted by the
College and University Personnel Association (CUPA) that sheds some light
on this lack of mobility to the public sector.
We caution that the public and private institutions that respond to the
CUPA survey are not a random sample. Hence the reader should not pre-
sume that the average salary figures we report below are accurate estimates
for the populations of public and private institutions. In addition, we do
not have access to the CUPA data at the individual institutional level and
TABLE 3
MOBILITY OF PRIVATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS,
1992–1993 AND 1996–1997
Presidents in the sample who, in the 484 477 474 470
next year:
1. Stayed at the same institution 429 430 442 424
2. Moved to another institution 4 0 2 1
3. Left the sample of institutions* 48 42 26 41
4. Their institution left the sample. 0 3 4 4
Source: Authors’ calculations from data reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education. Interim
presidents are not included.
*We obtained information on the post-presidency status of many of the individuals who left the
sample of institutions from Who’s Who in America, exhaustive searches of the World Wide Web, and a
telephone survey of the presidents’ offices at their former institutions conducted by Cornell’s
Computer Assisted Survey Team (CAST) in May 2000.
Academic Year
1992–93      1993–94      1994–95      1995–96
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are restricted to making comparisons from the data in the way that are re-
ported in the CUPA report. Despite these weaknesses, the CUPA data do
permit us to compare public and private presidents’ median salaries, along
with two measures of the relative size of their institutions.
The top panel of the table indicates that the median size public institution
in the CUPA sample in 1999 had an annual operating budget of $50.5 million,
while the median size private institution had a budget of $34.8 million. The
salaries of the presidents at the median public and private institutions were
$132,098 and $176,800, respectively. Thus, although the median private in-
stitution had an operating budget that was only .689 times the operating budget
of the median public institution, the ratio of the median private president’s
salary to the median public president’s salary was 1.338. The bottom panel of
the table presents similar data when the institutions are ranked by enrollment
size. It yields the same conclusion—namely, that presidents of private insti-
tutions get paid considerably more than their counterparts at public insti-
tutions even though their counterparts lead substantially larger institutions.4
TABLE 4
MEDIAN SALARIES OF PRESIDENTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INSTITUTIONS IN 1999: BY OPERATING BUDGETS AND ENROLLMENT
By Budgets
Median size institution $50.5 million $34.8 million 0.689
Median institution’s $132,098 $176,800 1.338
president salary
By Enrollments
Median size institution 4,532 1,560 0.344
Median institution’s $132,196 $175,900 1.331
president salary
Source: 1999–2000 Administrative Compensation Survey (Washington, DC: College and University
Personnel Association, 2000), Tables 2, 3, 6, 7.
Public Private Private /
Public Ratio
4The slight difference in the median salaries in the two panels of the table probably re-
flects incomplete data from some institutions on either budgets or enrollments.
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TABLE 5
MEAN VALUES OF PRIVATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
PRESIDENTS’ CHARACTERISTICS IN 1996
Seniority 8.2 6.2 9.1 7.9
Age at start of 48 51 47 48
  position
Clergy .15 .15 .24 .02
Female .18 .08 .21 .21
Prior presidency .24 .31 .23 .23
n 378 72 185 121
Source: Authors’ computations from data on the presidents found in the American Council on
Education’s The American President data file, supplemented by information obtained from Marquis
Who’s Who in American Education: 1996–97 (New Providence, NJ: Reed Reference Publishing, 1995)
and Marquis Who’s Who in America: 1997 (New Providence, NJ: Reed Reference Publications, 1996).
Who are the presidents in our sample? Table 5 presents some background
data on their characteristics as of 1996–1997. The typical president in our
sample began his or her presidency at age 48 and had been in the position for
over eight years. About 15% of the presidents were members of the clergy; they
are found most often in comprehensive institutions. About 18% of the presi-
dents were women, but the percentage of women presidents at research and
doctoral institutions was only 8%. Finally one quarter of them had been
president at least once before coming to their current position. We were able
to identify the institution of the prior presidency for 57. Almost three-quarters
of the prior presidencies were at other private, primarily four-year institutions.
The other quarter of prior presidencies were at individual public campuses
or statewide public systems. Among the presidents who had previously held
public presidencies were the presidents of three Ivy League institutions. Each
of these three had previously been a president at a Big Ten institution.
ANALYSES OF PRESIDENTS’ SALARY AND COMPENSATION LEVELS
What might be hypothesized to determine the salary and compensation
level5  of an American private college or university president? On the one
5The empirical models in this section are similar in spirit to those found in Boulanger
and Pliskin (1999) who use presidents’ compensation data for 1995–1996 obtained from the
Chronicle of Higher Education.
All Research &
Doctorate
Comprehensive Liberal Arts
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hand, we hypothesize that certain characteristics of the president will be
influential, including years in the position, whether the president held a
prior presidency, and, if so, the number of years at that position. Presidents
who are members of the clergy might be expected to have lower salaries
because they are less motivated by market forces and are often presidents of
religiously affiliated institutions. Holding constant prior experience and
tenure in the position, evidence that a president’s age or gender influence
his or her salary might reflect different market conditions for presidents
with these types of characteristics or the operation of age or gender dis-
crimination in the market for presidents.
Characteristics of the institution that influence the president’s responsi-
bility include size (measured by enrollments), complexity (as measured by
institutional type), and the level of research volume (for research and doc-
toral institutions). Variables that reflect the revenues coming into the insti-
tution should also matter. Institutions with higher endowments per student,
larger enrollments, higher average faculty salaries and entering classes with
higher average test scores should also pay higher salaries to presidents. We
project that this last variable is important because the academic selectivity
of an institution affects its applicant flow, its yield on accepted applicants,
the level of tuition that it can charge, and the fraction of its tuition that it
must give back to students in the form of financial aid to induce them to
attend the institution.
 Column 1 of Table 6 presents estimates of the determinants of the loga-
rithm of a president’s salary, using data pooled across presidents/institu-
tions and years for the 1992–1993 to 1996–1997 period. With slightly more
than 400 presidents per year and five years of data, we have more than 2,000
observations. The explanatory variables in the model include the president’s
age, gender, tenure in position, whether he or she held a prior presidency,
tenure at the prior presidency, and whether the president is a member of
the clergy. The logarithms of endowment per student, annual fund-raising
level per student, full-time equivalent enrollment, the average salary of pro-
fessors at the institution and the institution’s research and development
expenditures (for research and doctoral institutions) are also included in
the model.6  Also included is an estimate of the average SAT scores of en-
rolled freshman at the institution, dichotomous variables for the year that
the observation comes from, and dichotomous variables to control for
nonreporting many of the included variables. For the source of each vari-
able, see the Data Appendix.
It is plausible to hypothesize that doctoral and research universities are
more difficult to lead than comprehensive universities, which are in turn
6Interestingly, endowment per student and annual fund-raising level per student are not
very highly correlated across institutions in the sample.
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TABLE 6
PRESIDENT SALARY AND COMPENSATION EQUATIONS,
1992–1993 TO 1996–1997 SAMPLE
(absolute value t-statistics)
Age 0.0001 0.0011 0.0010 0.0004 0.0000
(0.1) (0.8) (0.8) (0.4) (0.0)
Female -0.0076 0.0176 0.0008 -0.0105 0.0145
(0.5) (1.0) (0.1) (0.7) (0.8)
Seniority 0.0058 0.0075 0.0051 0.0063 0.0067
(5.1) (5.5) (4.5) (5.3) (5.9)
Prior presidency 0.0054  -0.0100 0.0270 0.006 10.0048
(0.3) (0.5) (1.3) (0.3) (0.2)
Years at prior presidency 0.0057 0.0070 0.0042 0.0056 0.0065
(2.1) (2.4) (1.5) (2.1) (2.3)
Clergy -0.1938 -0.2163 -0.1741 -0.1962
(10.1) (9.9) (8.7) (9.7)
Professor average salary 0.4896 0.4347 0.4675 0.4727
(3.5) (3.0) (3.2) (3.1)
Endowment per student 0.0313 0.0424 0.0497 0.0329 0.0345
(3.6) (4.3) (6.9) (3.6) (3.9)
Gifts per student 0.0021 0.0037 0.0011 0.0016 0.0064
(0.5) (0.6) (0.3) (0.4) (1.6)
Enrollment 0.1415 0.1569 0.1890 0.1401 0.1494
(7.1) (7.0) (15.5) (6.8)  (7.0)
Freshman test scores 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002
(2.2) (2.3) (7.3) (2.4) (1.6)
R&D expenditures 0.0138 0.0071 0.009 00.0147 0.0112
(1.3) (0.6) (0.8) (1.3) (1.0)
Research/doctoral 0.1245 0.1311 0.1487 0.1322 0.1315
university (2.5) (2.2) (3.2) (2.6) (2.6)
                                                                    (1)                 (2)              (3)                 (4)              (5)
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more difficult to lead than liberal arts institutions. The presence of a sub-
stantial volume of research, along with large Ph.D. programs, increases the
complexity of the doctoral and research universities and adds another set
of objectives about which their presidents must be concerned that presi-
dents of comprehensives do not face. The multiplicity of programs present
at the comprehensives, as compared to the liberal arts colleges, may make
being president of the comprehensives more difficult jobs than the presi-
dencies of liberal arts colleges. If this is the case, institutional type per se
may be an important determinant of presidents’ salaries, and we also in-
clude dichotomous variables for institutional type in our estimating equa-
tion.
The coefficient estimates for this model are found in Column 1 of Table
6. They imply that presidents receive about 0.6% higher salaries a year for
each year of tenure in their current position and 0.5% higher salaries for
each year of tenure in a prior presidency.7  Clergy presidents receive about
19% less than other presidents, other factors held constant. Higher endow-
ments per student, enrollments, and average faculty salaries are all associ-
ated with higher presidents’ salaries, but the annual fund-raising level per
student is not. Finally, an increase in average SAT scores of 100 points at an
institution is associated with about a 2% increase in the president’s salary.
The estimated coefficients also suggest that presidents of research and
doctoral universities receive salaries that are about 12% higher, other vari-
ables held constant, than their colleagues at other institutional types. How-
ever, presidents of comprehensive universities do not appear to receive a
7We experimented with including quadratic terms in current and prior tenure to allow
for diminishing returns to tenure, but these variables’ coefficients never proved to be statis-
tically significant.
TABLE 6 (CONTINUED)
Comprehensive university 0.0154 0.0190 0.0129 0.0222 0.0196
(0.9) (0.9) (0.7) (1.3) (1.1)
Number of observations 2074 1552 2074 1930 1851
R-squared 0.6456 0.6456 0.605 0.6488 0.6413
Where (1) includes all presidents discussed in Table 1, salary is dependent variable; (2) same as (1),
with salary + benefits is the depended variable; (3) same as (1); (4) same as (1) does not include
presidents in their last year of presidency; (5) same as (1), does not include presidents who are clergy
aall regressions used robust standard errors. Also included in each equation are year dichotomous
variables and dichotomous variables for nonreporting of age, endowment per student, average
professor  salary, test scores, research and development revenue, and prior presidency.
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pay premium relative to presidents of liberal arts colleges, once we control
for other variables in the model.
The remaining columns of Table 6 present coefficient estimates that test
the sensitivity of our findings to various permutations of the data and as-
sumptions. Column 2 presents coefficient estimates of the identical model
save that the dependent variable is now the logarithm of compensation (sal-
ary plus reported benefits). The sample size is reduced because data on presi-
dents’ benefits were reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education starting
only in 1993–1994. However, the pattern of results is very similar to those
in the previous column.
The models estimated so far specify that a president’s salary is related to
the average salary of faculty at the same institution. A goal of the next sec-
tion will be to see if we can explain differences across institutions in the rate
of growth of presidential compensation relative to the rate of growth of
faculty compensation. However, it is reasonable to argue here that average
faculty salary is endogenous and determined by many of the same forces
that influence a president’s salary. So in Column 3 we present coefficients
of the president’s salary equation that omit the average professor salary vari-
able.
The coefficients of the variables in this equation are very similar to the
corresponding coefficients found reported in Column 1. As we expected,
the coefficients of endowment per student, enrollment and freshman test
scores increase in magnitude, with the impact of the level of average SAT
scores on presidents’ salaries tripling in magnitude. The increases in the
magnitudes of these variables’ coefficients occur because part of these vari-
ables’ impact on presidents’ salaries operated in the previous equations
through their effects on average faculty salaries.
Column 4 of Table 6 presents estimates of coefficients from the same
president’s salary equation that is found in Column 1. We have omitted
from the estimation sample here any year-president observation in which
the president was in the last year of his or her tenure. However, this restric-
tion leads to only marginal changes in any of the estimated coefficients.
Finally, in Column 5, we exclude all clergy presidents from the sample. This
exclusion does not significantly change any of the remaining coefficients in
the model.
The estimates presented in Table 6 assume that the impact of any ex-
planatory variable on a president’s salary, other than the dichotomous vari-
able for institutional type, is the same for presidents at all types of
institutions. To see whether this is true, we reestimated our basic model for
each institutional type, first including and then excluding average faculty
salaries from the equations. The estimated coefficients from these models
are available in an earlier version of our paper (Ehrenberg, Cheslock, &
Epifantseva, 2000).
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The estimates of these models suggest that it is important to stratify the
data by institutional type when analyzing presidents’ salaries. Remember-
ing that all finding are ceteris paribus (other variables in the model held
constant), we find the following: a president’s age is positively associated
with salary for research and doctorate universities, but negatively associ-
ated for liberal arts colleges. Female presidents receive 3 to 6% less than
male presidents at comprehensive universities, but about 3.5% more than
male presidents at liberal arts colleges. Additional analyses suggest that this
latter differential is not solely a “women’s college” effect. Female presidents
of coeducational liberal arts colleges also receive higher salaries than their
male counterparts. Years of tenure at the current and at any past presidency
do not affect salaries of presidents of research and doctoral universities.
Both tenure measures are positively associated with the salaries of compre-
hensive university presidents; however, only tenure on the current job mat-
ters for liberal arts college presidents. Increases in endowment per student
have the largest impact on presidents’ salaries at liberal arts colleges, but
increases in incoming first-year student SAT scores do not lead to higher
salaries for the presidents of research and doctoral universities. Finally, at
research and doctoral institutions, the level of the president’s salary is posi-
tively associated with the institution’s level of research and development
expenditures. Substituting federally funded research and development ex-
penditures for this measure in the model yielded a similar positive relation-
ship.
ANALYSES OF PRESIDENTS’ SALARY AND COMPENSATION CHANGES
Interesting though they are, the results presented in the previous section
tell us little about whether private college university presidents are rewarded
for their “performance.” To say, for example, that wealthier institutions with
larger endowments pay higher salaries to their presidents is not the same
thing as saying that presidents whose institutions’ endowments grow at
above-average rates receive, other factors held constant, above-average sal-
ary increases. Indeed, while the first statement has been shown to be true,
there are good reasons why the second statement should not be true.
To see this, note that the growth of an institution’s endowment depends
upon four factors: (a) the total rate of return on the institution’s endow-
ment, (b) the fraction of the endowment value that the institution spends
each year (its “spending rate”), (c) the total level of gifts to the institution in
a year, and (4) the fraction of those gifts which is placed in the endowment
rather than being used to fund current expenditures or capital projects.
The total rate of return on the endowment depends heavily on market con-
ditions and the investment policies specified by the trustees of the institu-
tion; the president has little influence over these factors. Similarly, the
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institution’s trustees determine the “spending rate.” While the president can
marshal arguments to influence the trustees’ decision, such arguments do
not always carry the day.
The president plays a major role—often the major role—in determining
the institution’s fund-raising success. Decisions on the current and capital
budgets to recommend to the trustees ultimately also rest with the presi-
dent. Tying a president’s salary increases to growth in the endowment would
provide him or her with an incentive to skimp on capital projects and to
not earmark annual gifts for current operations.
This line of reasoning suggests that it would be foolish for trustees to tie
a president’s salary or compensation growth to the growth rate of the
institution’s endowment. A much better strategy would be to reward the
president for maintaining an already high level of annual fund raising or
for increasing the institution’s fund-raising levels. So we expect to find rela-
tionships between fund-raising success and presidents’ salary and compen-
sation increases, rather than between endowment changes and their salary
and compensation increases.
Boards of trustees have been strongly advised by two successful univer-
sity presidents (one now doing other things) that the best way to reward a
successful president is by deferred compensation payments, which are not
as “visible” as annual salary increases. They also note that such payments
are often explicitly tied to presidents’ success in raising funds (Fisher & Koch,
1996). Hence we expect the performance-compensation relationship to be
stronger than the performance-salary relationship.
However, teasing out any relationships that exist between presidents’ sal-
ary or compensation changes and their “performance” is not an easy task.
Explicit or implicit incentive payments may occur at discrete points in time,
which differ across presidents. For example, the highest paid president in
1997–1998 was a liberal arts college president who received a hefty retire-
ment package in recognition of twenty years of outstanding service to the
college. The chairman of the college’s board of trustees credited the presi-
dent for having built the college’s endowment, reduced its debt, and en-
hanced its academic reputation (Burd, 1999). Because this reward for
performance was a discrete one that came at the end of the president’s term,
focusing on the relationship between his compensation change and the
institution’s performance over any period of time that did not include his
last year in office, would drastically understate the long-run relationship.
Similarly large compensation increases may be used as a way of “encour-
aging” a president to voluntarily resign and thus may reflect “nonperfor-
mance” rather than performance. One long-term comprehensive university
president who retired from his position in 1997–1998 was widely blamed
for the financial difficulties that his institution had suffered during his last
years in office. His large increase in compensation during his last year of
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office included a retirement package and a severance payment that will be
paid out over time. In accordance with IRS regulations, such payments were
recorded as deferred compensation in the year that they were granted (Burd,
1999).
If we exclude presidents who are in their last year of service from our
sample, we run the risk of substantially understating the relationship be-
tween compensation changes and performance. On the other hand, if we
include them, we run the risk that large increases in compensation may
reflect attempts to “buy presidents out” and reward bad performance, rather
than good performance. Either way, if data that span a relatively short-time
period are used, it is unlikely that we will observe a tight relationship be-
tween compensation changes and performance.
The results of our efforts to estimate such a relationship appear in Table
7. Its estimates are based on the sample of presidents who remained in the
same position between academic years 1992–1993 and 1996–1997 when
salary changes are analyzed and 1993–1994 to 1996–1997 when compensa-
tion changes are analyzed. In Column 1, the logarithm of the president’s
salary in 1996–1997 minus the logarithm of his or her salary in 1992–1993
(a measure of percentage salary change over a four-year period) is specified
to depend upon the type of institution that he or she leads, as well as the
change in each of the institutional level variables used in the analyses of the
presidents’ salary levels.
 Presidents’ salary changes during the period are positively and statisti-
cally significantly associated with their institutions’ enrollment growth, av-
erage professor salary growth, and, for research universities, their institutions’
growth in research and development expenditures. Analyses further indi-
cate that research and doctorate university presidents’ salary growth is also
significantly associated with the growth in total external (federal state and
corporate) research and development funding at their institutions. While
there is a positive association between presidents’ salary growth and the
growth in annual giving at institutions, this relationship is not statistically
significant. Institutional type per se does not appear to be associated with
salary growth. We also estimated presidents’ annual salary change equa-
tions using annual measures of performance and pooling the data across
years. The fit of these models was very poor and many fewer variables were
significant in each equation.
The estimates in Column 1 are for a model that permits the personal
characteristics that were assumed to influence presidents’ salary levels in
Table 6 to also influence presidents’ salary changes. These characteristics
are “dated” as of 1992–1993. Presidents with more seniority in their posi-
tion received larger salary increases during the period than presidents with
less seniority. Presidents who had held a previous presidency received smaller
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TABLE 7
PRESIDENTS’ SALARY AND COMPENSATION CHANGE EQUATIONSa
1992–1993 TO 1996–1997 SAMPLE
(absolute value t-statistics)
Age 0.0006 0.0011 0.0007 0.0014 0.0003
(0.3) (0.6) (0.4) (0.6) (0.1)
Female 0.0325 0.0320 0.0341 0.0391 0.0351
(1.0) (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.0)
Seniority 0.0041 0.0000 0.0043 0.0041 0.0058
(1.8) (0.0) (1.9) (1.8) (2.6)
Prior presidency -0.0980 -0.0483 -0.0950 -0.0973 -0.1048
(2.1) (1.2) (2.0) (2.2) (2.2)
Years at prior 0.0088 0.0056 0.0096 0.0090 0.0095
presidency (1.5) (1.1) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
Clergy -0.0913 -0.0368 -0.1038 -0.1030
(2.5) (1.0) (2.9) (2.9)
Professor average 0.4677 0.1438 0.4596 0.2096
  salary (3.2) (0.9) (3.1) (1.4)
Endowment per student 0.0325 0.0000 0.0339 -0.0304 0.0614
(1.0) (0.0) (1.1) (0.9) (1.9)
Gifts per student 0.0417 -0.0003 0.0411 0.0589 0.0312
(1.5) (0.0) (1.4) (2.0) (1.1)
Enrollment 0.1540  -0.0036   0.1817 0.1310 0.1170
(2.1) (0.1) (2.5) (1.9) (1.6)
Freshman test scoresb 0.0002 0.0000 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0023
(0.1) (0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.8)
R&D expenditures 0.1941 0.2425 0.1951 0.1912 0.2098
(2.9) (4.2) (2.8) (2.9) (3.2)
Research/doctoral -0.0741 0.0078 -0.0565 -0.0759 -0.0583
university (0.9) (0.1) (0.7) (0.9) (0.7)
                                                             (1)                  (2)                    (3)               (4)          (5)
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salary increases. Finally, presidents who were members of the clergy also
received smaller salary increases during the period.
In Column 2 we use compensation changes rather than salary changes as
the dependent variable. Inasmuch as compensation includes deferred pay-
ments and, as noted above, deferred payments are believed to be the route
by which a good deal of the pay for performance for presidents occurs, we
expect the compensation change model to “outperform” the salary change
model. While we caution that the compensation change data cover fewer
years (because the Chronicle first reported benefit data for 1993–1994), in
fact the opposite is true. We are less successful in explaining presidents’ com-
pensation changes than we are in explaining their salary changes. When we
estimated the presidents’ salary change equation for the shorter period, its
fit was somewhat poorer than that of the model (Table 1) but still better
than that of the compensation equation. The only variable that proves to be
statistically significant is the change in research and development expendi-
ture variable for the research universities. Reporting errors in the benefits
(deferred compensation) data and the timing of deferred compensation
awards make inferring relationships from the compensation change data
very difficult.
Returning to the salary change data, in Column 3 we present estimates
of a model that excluded average faculty salary growth because this variable
is likely influenced by several of the other variables in the model. The pa-
rameter estimates that we obtain are very similar to those obtained in Col-
umn 1. In Column 4, we reestimate the model, excluding presidents who
are in the last year of their presidency. Doing so improves the fit of the
model. Moreover, increases in the level of external gifts per student are now
seen to be significantly positively related to the presidents’ salary increases.
TABLE 7 (CONTINUED)
Comprehensive university 0.0188 0.0268 0.0212 0.0170 0.0298
(0.7) (1.1) (0.8) (0.7) (1.2)
Number of observations 267 268 267 238 238
Adj. R-squared 0.0959 0.0428 0.0657 0.1289  0.081
Where (1) includes all presidents who remained at the same institution from 1992–1993 to 1996–
1997, salary is dependent variable; (2) includes all presidents who remained at the same institution
from 1993–1994 to 1996–1997, salary + benefits is the depended variable; (3) same as (1); (4) same as
(1) does not include presidents in their last year of presidency in 1996/97; (5) same as (1), does not
include presidents who are clergy.
aAlso included in each equation are dichotomous variables for nonreporting of age, endowment per
student, average professor salary, test scores, research and development revenue, and prior presidency
bCoefficient has been multiplied by 10.
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Finally in Column 5 we exclude clergy presidents, only marginally chang-
ing the remaining coefficients of the model.
We also estimated presidents’ salary-level change equations with the data
stratified by institutional type. The estimated coefficients of these equations
are again available in the earlier version of our paper. These estimates suggest
that presidents’ salary changes are associated with their faculty members’
average salary increases at all three types of institutions, with the relationship
being strongest at the research/doctoral institutions. Research and develop-
ment expenditure changes are associated with presidents’ salary changes at the
latter institutions, and presidents’ salary changes at comprehensive institu-
tions are associated with their institutions’ enrollment growth over the pe-
riod. However, none of our other performance measures proves significant.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Taken together, our results provide only weak support for the hypothesis
that presidents’ salary and compensation changes are related to our mea-
sures of their institutions’ performance. Somewhat surprisingly, freshman
test score changes are not associated with presidents’ salary growth. Only
when presidents in their last year of tenure are excluded from the sample
are presidents’ salary increases associated with improvements in their fund-
raising success. Reporting error problems and the problems associated with
the timing of deferred payments made it difficult for us to tease out any
behavioral relationships from the presidents’ compensation change equa-
tions. Similarly, our excluding from our analyses other measurable variables
(such as the football team’s record) and less easily measured variables (such
as the president’s relationship with the board), added to our difficulty.
Our salary and compensation change analyses are for a sample of presi-
dents who remained in office for a four-year period during the 1990s. It
may well be the case that the major rewards that presidents receive for their
performance are continued tenure in office, the opportunity to retire at
later ages, or opportunities to move to higher paying positions in either the
academic or nonacademic sectors. In future work, we hope to explore the
determinants of presidents’ tenure in office, retirement ages, and mobility
to different positions.
DATA APPENDIX
Compensation Data
We use college presidents’ compensation data from the Chronicle of Higher
Education’s pay-and-benefit survey, which restricts us to studying private institu-
tions. From this sample, we exclude presidents with very low salaries (< $40,000),
interim presidents, presidents who worked only part of the year, and presidents
with missing data.
EHRENBERG, CHESLOCK, & EPIFANTSEVA / Paying Presidents 35
Demographic and Experience Variables
We use the American Council of Education’s National President Study for data on
age, gender, seniority, prior presidency, and years of experience at prior presidency.
For some presidents without information in the ACE data set, we were able to ob-
tain data from Who’s Who in America or Who’s Who in Education. The prior presi-
dency variable equals “1” if the individual was a president at another institution in
at least one of his or her previous two jobs. If the individual was a president during
both jobs, then years at prior presidency is a sum of the two tenures.
Clergy
The Chronicle of Higher Education’s pay-and-benefit survey provides data on
whether a president is a member of the clergy.
Enrollment
With data from the IPEDS Enrollment Survey, we compute full-time equivalent
enrollment by weighting part-time students as one-third. Both undergraduate and
graduate students are included.
Endowment per Student
Data on the market value of endowment assets from the IPEDS Finance Survey
are divided by full-time equivalent enrollment.
Professors’ Average Salary
We compute professors’ average salary from the IPEDS Faculty Salary Survey by
summing the expenditures on assistant, associate, and full professors, then divid-
ing by the number of professors in these three groups. When examining changes in
average faculty salary over time, we also conduct analyses using faculty salary data
obtained from the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), as pub-
lished yearly in Academe. These data contain information on the average percent-
age of change in salary for continuing full professors. This variable is superior to
the change in the average salary of professors because the latter is sensitive to new
hires, retirements, and faculty turnover. However we also use the change in average
salary of professors in our analyses of presidents’ salary changes because the AAUP
data set does not contain continuous faculty salary change for many of the institu-
tions in our sample.
Test Scores
We use the College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges for data on the SAT and
ACT scores for the freshman class of each institution. This data set contains the
25th and 75th percentile for both verbal and math scores on the SAT, and 25th and
75th percentiles for the overall score on the ACT. To compute one SAT score, we
added the 25th percentile of the verbal score with the 75th verbal, 25th math, and
75th math, then divided by 2. To compute one ACT score, we added the 25th and
75th percentile of the overall score and then divided by 2. We did not use test scores
that are computed from less than 50% of an institution’s first-year class. In our
analysis, we used SAT scores whenever possible. For institutions with missing SAT
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scores but complete ACT scores, we converted the ACT scores to SAT scores. The
conversion is sensitive to the SAT Scale recentering that changed student scores in
the mid-1990s, and we took account of the recentering in our conversion.
Research and Development Expenditures
The National Science Foundation (NSF) Survey of Research and Development
Expenditures provided data on total research and development expenditures. We
used this variable only for research and doctoral institutions.
Timing
Because salary decisions are made in the spring or summer of the preceding
academic year, it is important to use data that are available to trustees at that time.
Therefore, to examine the 1994–1995 presidential compensation data, we used the
endowment value as of July 1, 1994, the enrollment data from fall 1993, the first-
year student test score data from fall 1993, and the research and development data
for the 1993–1994 academic year. We used the same pattern of timing with presi-
dential compensation data for the other years.
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